Schvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30
The Supreme Court’s judgment in the joined cases of Schvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and Dalston Projects Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30 is extraordinary. As will be argued in this blogpost, not only is the majority’s decision in respect of Mr Schvidler wrong in principle it is also self-inconsistent and incoherent. It is argued that the Schvidler is a dark chapter in the UK’s constitutional history. The most worrying aspect of the judgment is that it is given in the name of human rights and the respect of international law. Quite plainly, Mr Schvidler has been sacrificed by the Supreme Court (with Lord Leggatt strongly dissenting on Schvidler’s case) for the “greater good”.
Schvidler is reportedly a billionaire. Born in Russia but a citizen of the UK and the USA, he has not lived in Russia for many years. He maintains an apparently close friendship with Roman Abramovic, the former owner of Chelsea Football Club and a subject of UK sanctions. Due to Schvidler’s apparent links with those close to President Putin, the UK Government sought to sanction him in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Schvidler sought what is effectively (under Rule 79 of the Civil Procedure Rules) a judicial review of the decision to sanction him, challenging the decision on human rights grounds – inter alia, that his A1P1 ECHR right to property had been infringed.
Lady Rose and Lord Sales’s judgment contains many problematic elements in its disregard for Schvidler’s basic rights to enjoy his property without draconian interference from the UK government.
One such element is how low the threshold is set for the sanctions to be justified in pursuing the legitimate aim of pressuring Putin to end the war. For instance, at paragraph 102, the court holds that, ‘it was reasonable to suppose that Mr Shvidler might be able to put pressure on Mr Abramovich to try to influence President Putin’ even though the court simultaneously states it does not expect Schvidler or his family to place themselves in physical danger. Quite how pressure is to be applied to Putin without physical endangerment given the number of targeted assassinations – taking place even on British soil – is unclear. The link between Putin and Schvidler is tenuous at best and non-existent (at least currently) at worst; emphasis should be placed on the word ‘might’.
Indeed, the judgment goes on to water down the idea that Schvidler himself might impact geopolitics and the conduct of the war by further reducing the aim of the sanctions to merely sending ‘a signal’ (paragraph 102). Quite how sending ‘a signal’ can justify reducing Schvidler to asking the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (“OFSI”) for permission to order groceries is unclear. That question is never adequately answered by the court. Instead, the court relies on euphemisms such as ‘disruption’ to Schvidler’s ‘wealthy lifestyle’ (paragraph 213); the disruption is in fact open-ended and extreme.
Further still, the judgment treats the sanctions regime as a fact of nature rather than a legally constructed artifice. At paragraph 213, their Lordships claim that sanctions ‘have to be severe’ in order to serve their function. But the very point they go on to admit is that the sanction on Schvidler does not need itself to be effective in achieving any goal whatsoever. Rather, the sanction on Schvidler should be considered alongside the full package of measures against Russia, including other sanctions. This is the further euphemism of ‘the cumulative effect of the sanctions regime’ (paragraph 213). Relying on this aspirational ‘cumulative effect’ rather undermines the claim that sanctions ‘have to be’ anything; without knowing what sanctions will – and do – achieve, how can we be sure what they ‘have to be’. It is within the Government’s gift to alter the regime.
And, oddly, all of this is in the name of both human rights and international law. Contrary to J.S. Mill’s warning of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ and Kant’s prohibition on treating others as a means to an end, Schvidler and his family are being subjected to extremely harsh infringements on their civil liberties and basic rights due to a government decision to sanction them. At the same time, His Majesty’s ministers are said to be acting to uphold international law because the sanctions regime responds to Russia’s breach of international law by invading Ukraine. Far from these lofty ideals, Schvidler is being used as a ‘signal’ or example to others to ward them off dealing with Russian businesses, despite the government not being able to prove at all that sanctioning him will lead to Putin or anyone in charge of prosecuting the war on Ukraine.
